Your EDR sees syscalls.
Not agent sessions.
CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, and Microsoft Defender were built for human-initiated processes. Autonomous AI agents behave differently — they span tools, spawn subprocesses, and act on LLM instructions that your EDR never sees.
- Sees syscalls in isolation
- No concept of prompt or response
- Cannot reconstruct multi-step agent workflows
- No intent inference — behavior is opaque
- Alert fatigue without context
Kernel-level visibility into every agent action.
- Full agent session tracing across 13+ kernel hooks
- Plaintext prompt/response via SSL uprobes
- Provenance graph of every step in an attack chain
- On-device SLM infers agent intent in real time
- Targeted blocks, not noise
From kernel event to blocked attack chain.
Kernel hooks.
13+ eBPF and kernel hooks trace every agent process in real time — file reads, network calls, subprocess spawns, and memory access — without modifying the agent or its runtime.
execve · openat · connect · read · write · forkSSL uprobes.
SSL/TLS uprobes intercept plaintext prompt and response payloads before encryption. You see exactly what the LLM was asked to do and what it decided — at the wire level.
SSL_read · SSL_write · TLS 1.2/1.3Provenance graph.
Every kernel event is correlated into a causal provenance graph across the full agent session. A credential read that led to a subprocess spawn that attempted an outbound connection is one chain — not three unrelated events.
~/.ssh read → subprocess spawn → outbound connectionOn-device inference.
A small language model runs on-device to infer agent intent from the combined kernel trace and plaintext LLM traffic. No cloud round-trip. No sensitive telemetry leaving the host.
SLM · on-premise · <10ms latency// Ring Zero integrated stack
kernel hooks → ssl uprobes → provenance graph → on-device inference → policy enforcement
Observability. Context. Control.
13+ kernel hooks
eBPF-based hooks trace file access, network connections, process spawns, memory reads, and system calls across the full agent session lifecycle.
Plaintext observability
SSL/TLS uprobes intercept LLM prompt and response payloads before encryption — giving you visibility into agent intent without any proxy or agent modification.
Kernel-level DLP
Enforce data loss prevention at the kernel. Block access to credential stores, secret paths, and sensitive files before any data reaches a tool call or network socket.
Provenance graphs
Reconstruct the causal chain of multi-step attack sequences. See how a compromised prompt led to a credential read that led to an outbound connection — as one coherent story.
On-device SLM
A small language model infers agent intent locally. No cloud dependency, no telemetry leaving the host. Privacy-preserving by architecture, not policy.
Real-time policy blocks
Policies enforce at the kernel level — not just alert. Credential access, ad-hoc subprocess spawning, and unauthorized egress are blocked before they complete.
What your EDR sees as five alerts, Ring Zero reads as one attack.
The provenance graph correlates kernel events with LLM intent across the full agent session — reconstructing the causal chain from the original prompt injection to the attempted exfiltration. Defenders see the story, not just the events.
Malicious content in retrieved document instructs agent to exfiltrate credentials
Agent calls read_file tool — kernel open() syscall intercepted
bash -c invoked outside approved workflow — fork/execve pair logged
Credential payload compressed for exfiltration — gzip syscall sequence detected
connect() to external IP outside domain allowlist — blocked at kernel before packet leaves
Blocked. Not alerted.
Ring Zero enforces kernel-level policies that prevent malicious or out-of-scope agent actions in real time — before any damage occurs.
Credential access prevention.
Block any agent process from reading ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, or other secret store paths. Even if an agent is compromised via prompt injection and instructed to exfiltrate credentials, the kernel policy prevents the read from completing.
open(~/.ssh/id_rsa) → EPERMOutbound connection restriction.
Restrict agent network egress to an approved domain allowlist. Any outbound connection attempt to an unknown or unlisted domain is blocked at the kernel level before the packet leaves the host — regardless of which tool or subprocess the agent invoked.
connect(93.184.216.34:443) → ECONNREFUSEDShell execution guardrails.
Permit shell commands only within explicitly approved workflows. Ad-hoc or anomalous subprocess spawning — an agent launching bash, python -c, or curl outside its defined workflow context — is blocked and logged with full provenance.
execve(bash, [-c, ...]) → EPERM outside workflowSee what your EDR missed.
Ring Zero Security runs alongside your existing EDR. In a proof-of-concept deployment, we show you the delta — the attack chains your current tooling cannot see. Enterprise security teams only.
Linux prototype live. We deploy alongside your existing EDR for a scoped proof of concept.